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(A)

ARGUMENT

REBUTTAL OF EMPLOYER'S ARGUMENTS
The Claimant is submitting a consolidated Reply Brief and will first address the

Employer's Arguments and then the ISIF's Arguments.
(1)

THE EMPLOYER HAS CONCEDED THAT THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
EXCEEDED ITS LIMITED JURISDICTION AND ENTERED A VOID ORDER BY
AW ARD ING EMPLOYER A PPI CREDIT NOT AUTHORIZED BY IDAHO CODE
§72-408
Idaho Code §72-408 is the section of the Idaho workers' compensation Act which

defines the amount of total and permanent disability benefits that the Employer and the ISIF are
obligated to pay an injured worker who has become totally and permanently disabled:
72-408. INCOME
BENEFITS
FOR
TOTAL
AND
PARTIAL
DISABILITY. Income benefits for total and partial disability during the period
of recovery, and thereafter in cases of total and permanent disability, shall be
paid to the disabled employee subject to deduction on account of waiting period
and subject to the maximum and minimum limits set forth in section 72-409,
Idaho Code, as follows:
(1) For a period not to exceed a period of fifty-two (52) weeks, an amount equal
to sixty-seven per cent ( 67%) of his average weekly wage and thereafter an
amount equal to sixty-seven per cent (67%) of the currently applicable

Claimant/ Appellant/ Cross-Respondent's Reply Brief

average weekly state wage

1•

The literal words of Idaho Code §72-408 clearly do not authorize the Industrial
Commission to give Employers a credit for PPI benefits paid before the Claimant is deemed
totally and permanently disabled.
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent.
Robison v. Bateman-Hall, 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003).
Because "the best guide to legislative intent is the words of the statute itself," the
interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. In re
Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992); McLean v.
Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006).
Where the statutory language is unambiguous, "this Court does not construe it,
but simply follows the law as written." McLean, 142 Idaho at 813, 135 P.3d at
759. "Legislative definitions of terms included within a statute control and
dictate the meaning of those terms as used in the statute." State v. Yzaguirre, 144
Idaho 471,477, 163 P.3d 1183, 1189 (2007). "If the statute as written is socially
or otherwise unsound, the power to correct it is legislative, not iudj(:;gtL" In re
Estate of Miller, 143 Idaho 565, 567, 149 P.3d 840, 842 (2006). Mayer v. TPC
Holdings, Inc., Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 43468, filed 3.24.16 (emphasis
supplied).
The statutory construction question which is dispositive of all other issues in this case
can be stated as follows:
Did the version of Idaho Code §72-408 that existed when the Industrial
Commission entered its 6.26.14 Order give the Industrial Commission the
statutory authority to grant the Employer a PPI credit for PPI benefits paid
before the parties stipulated that the Claimant was totally and permanently
disabled? Answer: No.

1 The Claimant's total pennanent disability (TPD) rate in this case is 45% of the average weekly state wage because 67% of hi
average weekly wage was less than 45% of the average weekly state wage and Idaho Code §72-409(1) states that the weekly
benefit amounts set forth in Idaho Code §72-408(1) are subject to "a minimum of forty-five percent (45%) of the currently
applicable average weekly state wage".
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this Court applies proper canons

statutory construction to the plain and

unambiguous words of Idaho Code §72-408, the Court should reach the same conclusion that it
reached in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) and hold that the

Industrial Commission exceeded its limited jurisdiction v1hen it granted Employer a PPI credit
which was not authorized by Idaho Code §72-408 or any other provision of the entire workers'
compensation act that were in existence when the Industrial Commission entered its 6.26.14
Order:
1. There is no statutory basis in worker's compensation law to credit the
employer for permanent physical impairment benefits paid to the employee
before the award of total and permanent disability benefits. . ..

Examining worker's compensation law as a whole, Roe v. Albertson's Inc., 141
Idaho 524, 528, 112 P.3d 812, 816 (2005), this Court finds that there is no
statutory basis for the Commission to award Steel West a credit for permanent
physical impairment benefits previously paid to Corgatelli . ...
Thus, the current version of Idaho Code section 72-408, which provides for the
employee such as Corgatelli to receive total and permanent disability benefits,
includes no deduction or credit for previously paid permanent impairment
benefits in its award of disability benefits ....
No other statute in Idaho's worker's compensation law permits the employer to
receive credit for permanent physical impairment benefits paid before the award
of total and pennanent disability benefits. As a purely statutory scheme, the
Court cannot judicially construct a credit for employers into worker's
compensation law. Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150,
1154-1155 (2014) (bold in original) (emphasis supplied).
Even if this Court decides that its holding in Corgatelli cannot be applied retroactively
to the compensation agreement that was approved by the Industrial Commission in its 6.26.14
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Order

60 days

was decided

2,

that would not change the

and

words of Idaho Code §72-408 as they existed on the date when the Industrial Commission
granted the Employer the invalid PPI credit in its 6.26.14 Order.
If the Industrial Commission had properly applied basic canons of statutory construction

and simply followed the plain and unambiguous wording of Idaho Code §72-408 as written
when it entered its 10.6.15 Order denying the Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Relief, the
Commission would have reached the same conclusion reached by this Court in Corgatelli and
set aside its 6.26.14 Order as void because the Commission gave Employer a PPI credit that it
had no statutory authority to grant. The Industrial Commission cannot judicially construct a PPI
credit for the Employer that was not authorized by the literal words of Idaho Code §72-408 on
the date when the Commission entered its 6.26.14 Order:
No other statute in Idaho's worker's compensation law permits the employer to
receive credit for permanent physical impairment benefits paid before the award
of total and permanent disability benefits. As a purely statutory scheme, the
Court cannot judicially construct a credit for employers into worker's
compensation law. Our decision is consistent with other jurisdictions that have
considered similar issues and interpreted their workers' compensation statutes.
Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150, 1154-1155 (2014)
(emphasis supplied) ..
The Employer in this case has admitted in its 5.12.16 Respondent's Brief that it clearly
understands this Court' holding in Corgatelli and realizes that the Industrial Commission does
not have the statutory authority to give an Employer credit for PPI payments paid before the
Claimant is deemed totally and permanently disabled:

The Claimant has asked this Court to apply its holding in Corgatelli retroactively to the unique facts in this case. See discussion at pp. 28-34 of
the Claimant's 4.15.16 Opening Brief.

2
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This Court's decision in Corgatelli v. Steel West,
decided an issue
first
impression holding there is no statutory authority for an employer to receive
credit for PPI benefits paid before the award of total and permanent disability
benefits. 157 ldaho 287,292,335 P.3d 1150, 1155 (2014). (Seep. 9, LL 10-13 of
Employer's 5.12.16 Respondent's Brief) (emphasis supplied).
If the Employer understands that there is no statutory basis for the Industrial

Commission to give an Employer a credit for PPI benefits paid before the Claimant is deemed
totally and permanently disabled, then why has the Employer taken the unreasonable position
throughout these proceedings that it is entitled to claim an invalid PPI credit that the Industrial
Commission did not have the authority to grant?
All of the Employer's arguments are based on the false premise that the Commission's
6.26.14 Order is a valid final Order when the Employer knows that it is a void Order because
the Commission did not have the statutory authority to grant the PPI credit. The Court should
Order the Employer to pay the Claimant's attorney's fees at every stage of this litigation
because it has denied the Claimant all of the total and permanent disability benefits that he is
entitled to receive under Idaho Code §72-408 knowing the whole time that the Industrial
Commission did not have the statutory authority to grant Employer the PPI credit 3 .
The bedrock principle at the heart of the Claimant's appeal is that the Industrial
Commission exceeded the limited jurisdiction granted to it by Idaho Code §72-408 when it
granted Employer a PPI credit not authorized by Idaho Code §72-408

4 :

The Commission has no jurisdiction other than that which the legislature has
speeifically granted to it. The Commission therefore exercises limited
3

See Claimant's argument for attorney's fees at pp. 40-42 of Claimant's 4.15.16 Opening Brief and at pp. 28-30, infra.
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund agrees with the premise that the Industrial Commission only has limited jurisdiction and can only
perform those acts specifically authorized by statute. See pages 8-10 of!SIF's 5.12.16 Response Brief.

4
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jurisdiction, with nothing being presumed
favor
its jurisdiction. See
Power Co. v. Idaho Pub. Util. Comm'n, 102 Idaho 744, 750, 639 P.2d 442, 448
(1981) (jurisdiction of Public Utilities Commission limited). Curr v. Curr, 124
Idaho 686,690,864 P. 132, 136 (1993).
In Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993), the Court pointed out: "As
a creature of legislative invention, the Commission may only act pursuant to an
enumerated power, whether it be directly statutory or based upon rules and
regulations properly issued by the Commission under LC. § 72-508." Id. at 691,
864 P.2d at 137. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Edmondson, 130
Idaho 108,111,937 P.2d 420,424 (1997).
As an agency of limited jurisdiction that derives its authority from the workers'
compensation Act, the Industrial Commission had a duty to follow the plain and literal words of
Idaho Code §72-408 as written by the legislature and did not have the authority to judicially
construct a credit which is not authorized by Idaho Code §72-408:
No other statute in Idaho's worker's compensation law permits the employer to
receive credit for permanent physical impairment benefits paid before the award
of total and permanent disability benefits. As a purely statutory scheme, the
Court [Industrial Commission] cannot judicially construct a credit for employers
into worker's compensation law. Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287,
335 P.3d 1150, 1154-1155 (2014).
Since the Industrial Commission did not have the authority to judicially construct a PPI
credit into the language of Idaho Code §72-408, this Court should enter a dispositive ruling that
the Commission's 6.26.14 Order is void:
A judgment of a court without jurisdiction is void, and void judgments may be
attacked at any time. Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508
(2003) (emphasis supplied).
[A] judgment by a tribunal without authority, or which exceeds or lies beyond its
authority, is necessarily void, and may be shown to be so in collateral
proceedings, even though it be a court of general jurisdiction, because no
authority derived from the law can transcend the source from whence it
came. 33 Idaho at 462, 195 P. at 627 (emphasis added), cited with approval in
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Spaulding v. Childrens' Home Finding and Aid Society of North Idaho, Inc., 89
Idaho 10, 25, 402 P.2d 52, 67 (1965). We have also stated that "[a] void
judgment is a nullity, and no rights can be based thereon; it can be set aside on
motion or can be collaterally attacked at any time." Prather v. Loyd, 86 Idaho 45,
50, 382 P.2d 910, 915 (1963) (citations omitted). Thus, the issue of whether a
court has exceeded its jurisdiction is always open to collateral attack in Idaho.
Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984) (emphasis
supplied).
Granted that a court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter of an
action, its judgment may nevertheless be void if it does not have jurisdiction to
render the particular relief which the judgment undertakes to grant. Maloney v.
Zipf, 41 Idaho 30, 237 P. 632; Baldwin v. Anderson, 51 Idaho 614, 8 P.2d 461;
Curtis v. Siebrand Bros. Circus & Carnvial Co., 68 Idaho 285, 194 P.2d 281.
The action of the court in granting a lien to the husband and against the
community property of the parties was in excess of its authority and void.
Judgments may be entered in cases where the court has undoubted jurisdiction
over the subject-matter, and of the parties, mnevertl}eles§ may be void because
the court decided some question which it had no power to decide, or granted
some relief which it had no power to grant. If a court grants relief which under
no circumstances it has any authority 'to grant, its judgment is to that extent void,
* * *. (* * * Gile v. Wood, 32 Idaho 752, 188 P. 36; Bridges v. Clay County
Supervisors, 57 Miss. 252; Seamster v. Blackstock, 83 Va. 232, 2 S.E. 36, 5
Am.St.Rep. 262; * * *)' Wright v. Atwood, 33 Idaho 455, at page 461, 195 P.
625, at page 627. Martin v. Soden, 81 Idaho 274, 284-285, 340 P.2d 848, 854855 (1959) ( emphasis supplied).
Although the Claimant argued to the Industrial Commission that it should set aside its
6.26.14 Order because the Commission lacked jurisdiction to award a PPI credit that was not
authorized by Idaho Code §72-408, the Commission completely ignored the Claimant's
statutory construction arguments and lack of jurisdiction arguments and did not even mention
Idaho Code §72-408 a single time in its 10.6.15 Order denying the Claimant's Petition For
Declaratory Relief (R. pp. 99-112). The Commission's decision to completely ignore the plain
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language of Idaho

§72-408 without discussion or

is

to comprehend

the Commission literally derives its authority from the statute and the plain words of Idaho
Code §72-408 should determine the validity of the Commission's 6.26.14 Order and the
outcome of this case.
When the Employer filed its Respondent's Brief on 5.12.16, the Employer adopted the
same approach as the Industrial Commission and completely ignored the Claimant's limited
jurisdiction arguments and statutory construction arguments and did not even mention Idaho
Code §72-408 a single time in its entire 18-page Brief.

If the Employer truly believed that the

plain and unambiguous language of Idaho Code §72-408 gave the Industrial Commission the
authority to grant Employer a PPI credit when the Commission entered its 6.26.14 Order, then
the Employer had an obligation to present contrary legal argument and contrary legal authority
in its 5.12.16 Respondent's Brief to support that position:
Theories and defenses should be determined by the parties, not the tribunal. Just
as in Sales, where we held it was error for the district court to raise an
affirmative defense not raised by the parties, the Commission erred here in
raising collateral estoppel, which was never raised by Employer/Surety before
the Commission invited briefing on the issue. Although Employer/Surety may
not have known the complete substance of the ISIF agreement, there is no
question it knew ISIF had settled with Deon and therefore knew ISIF had
accepted some level of liability to Deon. Despite this knowledge, either
intentionally or by oversight, Employer/Surety chose not to raise estoppel
theories as a defense to Deon's claim. In Heitz, we held that a party is bound by
the theory upon which it tries its case. We cannot speak to the reasons
Employer/Surety failed to assert estoppel, but just as in Sales and Heitz,
Employer/Surety is held to that choice. The Commission cannot raise the defense
of collateral estoppel for Employer/Surety even if it felt Employer/Surety would
have prevailed had it chosen to raise the issue. Our system works best when the
parties devise their own litigation strategies. Deon v. H&J, Inc., 157 Idaho 665,
671,339 P.3d 550, 557 (2014) (emphasis supplied).
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The Employer in this case chose to remain silent on the fundamental threshold issue of
whether the Industrial Commission exceeded its limited jurisdiction by granting a PPI credit not
authorized by Idaho Code §72-408.

The Employer in this case chose to remain silent on

whether the Industrial Commission properly employed the canons of statutory construction
when it interpreted the literal words of Idaho Code §72-408.
By choosing to remain silent and not present any contrary argument or legal authority on
these threshold jurisdictional issues, the Employer has effectively conceded the merit of the
Claimant's arguments and admitted that Industrial Commission exceeded its limited jurisdiction
because the plain language of Idaho Code §72-408 does not give the Industrial Commission the
jurisdiction to award a PPI credit:
When the opening brief contains no authority on an issue presented, it is
immaterial that the party provides authority either in a reply brief or in
supplemental briefing because the issue had already been waived. See Estes, 132
Idaho at 87, 967 P.2d at 289. Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 669, 115 P.3d
756, 760 (2005).
The Employer in this case chose to remain silent and not offer any contrary argument or
legal authority in opposition to the Claimant's limited jurisdiction and statutory construction
arguments because the Employer cannot refute the logic of this Court's holding in Corgatelli
and just invent a PPI credit which does not exist anywhere in the entire workers' compensation
Act. If the Employer wants the legal right to claim a PPI credit against its obligation to pay
total and pem1anent disability benefits, then its remedy is to ask the legislature to amend Idaho
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§72-408 because the Industrial Commission and the

do not

to

legislate from the bench and judicially construct a credit which does not exist in the statute.
(2)

THE EMPLOYER HAS CONCEDED THAT THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
EXCEEDED ITS LIMITED JURISDICTION AND ENTERED A VOID ORDER
WHEN IT APPROVED A COl\1PENSii,TIQN AGREEi'.1ENT THAT DID NOT
CONFORM TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE LAW IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF
IDAHO CODE §72-711
The Claimant also argued in his 4.15.16 Opening Brief that the Industrial Commission

exceeded the limited jurisdiction granted to it by Idaho Code §72-711 when it approved a
compensation agreement that did not conform to the provisions of the law:
72-711. Compensation agreements. If the employer and the afflicted employee
reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this law, a memorandum of
the agreement shall be filed with the commission, and, if approved by it,
thereupon the memorandum shall for all purposes be an award by the
commission and be enforceable under the provisions of section 72- 735, unless
modified as provided in section 72- 719. An agreement shall be approved by
the commission only when the terms conform to the provisions of this law
(underline and bold supplied).

The compensation agreement approved by the Industrial Commission in its 6.26.14
Order did not conform to the provisions of the workers' compensation Aet because Idaho Code
§72-408 does not authorize the Commission to grant the Employer a PPI credit.

When the Employer admitted on page 9 of 5.12.16 Respondent's Brief that it clearly
understood this Court's holding in Corgatelli and admitted that it knows that there is absolutely
no statutory authority in the entire workers' compensation Act which gives the Industrial
Commission the statutory authority to award the Employer a PPI credit, that was tantamount to
an admission that the Industrial Commission exceeded the limited jurisdiction of Idaho Code
§72-711 when it approved a compensation agreement which did not confonn to the provisions
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of the law. However, rather than

cogent legal argument and authority to support its

position that the Commission did not exceed the limited jurisdiction granted to it by Idaho Code
§72-711 when it approved a compensation agreement which did not conform to the provisions
of the law, the Employer simply chose to dodge the Idaho Code §72-711 issue by making the
absurd argument that the stipulation in this case was not really a compensation agreement
subject to the requirements of Idaho Code §72-711, but rather a mere stipulation to dismiss like
the stipulation to dismiss found in Emery v. JR. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 111 P.3d 92
(2005):
The Stipulation is not a lump-sum settlement agreement as contemplated by
Idaho Code § 72-404, or a compensation agreement under Idaho Code § 72-711;
rather the Stipulation is an agreement among the parties to resolve the underlying
claims, which is authorized pursuant to Rule 12.D, JRP, which states: "The
Commission may, on presentation of sufficient grounds or good cause, dismiss a
complaint pursuant to stipulation by the parties" See also Emery v. JR. Simplot
Co., 141 Idaho 407, 410, 1111 P.3d 92, 95 (2005) (Sec p. 8, LL 5-11 of
Employer's 5.12.16 Response Brief) (emphasis supplied).
The Employer cannot avoid the limited jurisdiction problem created by Idaho Code §72711 simply by making the absurd argument that the compensation agreement in this case is not
really a compensation agreement but merely a stipulation to dismiss like the stipulation in

Emery. Unlike the stipulation in Emery, the compensation agreement in this case requires the
Employer and the ISIF to make periodic monthly payments of total and permanent disability
benefits to the Claimant each month beginning on the stipulated date of MMI on 10.1.13 and
continuing each month thereafter for the rest of the Claimant's life pursuant to Idaho Code §72408 and Idaho Code §72-409. The stipulation in this case is clearly a compensation agreement
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which requires periodic payments and is

to the requirements of Idaho Code

711.
There are only 2 types of agreements that can be used by the Employer and the ISIF
under the \Vorkers' compensation Li\ct to resolve their liability for the payment of total and

permanent disability benefits: (1) the parties can enter into a lump sum settlement agreement
which must be approved by the Industrial Commission pursuant to Idaho Code §72-404; or (2)
the parties can enter into a compensation agreement like the one in this case which requires the
periodic payment of monthly total and permanent disability benefits pursuant to Idaho Code
§72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409 which must be approved by the Industrial Commission
pursuant to Idaho Code §72-711:
Once a determination is made regarding the degree of a claimant's permanent
disability, compensation for that disability may be awarded either through
periodic payments, LC. §§ 72-408, -409, or through a single lump sum payment,
I.C. § 72-404. The particular method of compensation is left largely to the
discretion of the parties, subject to the approval of the Industrial Commission,
LC.§§ 72-404, 72-711. Harmon v. Lute's Const. Co., Inc., 112 Idaho 291,293,
732 P.2d 260,262 (1986) (emphasis supplied).
If the Employer was going to seriously contend that the compensation agreement in this

case was not really a compensation agreement that is subject to the requirements of Idaho Code
§72-711, then the Employer had an obligation to present cogent legal argument and legal
authority to support its argument that the compensation agreement in this case was not subject
to the requirements of Idaho Code §72-711:
When the opening brief contains no authority on an issue presented, it is
immaterial that the party provides authority either in a reply brief or in
supplemental briefing because the issue had already been waived. See Estes, 132
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Idaho at 87, 967
756, 760 (2005).

at 289. Gallagher v.

141

115

The Employer's entire legal analysis of the Claimant's Idaho Code §72-711 argument
consisted of deliberately mischaracterizing the compensation agreement as a mere stipulation to
dismiss.

By choosing to remain silent on the merits of the Idaho Code §72-711 limited

jurisdiction issue and not make any cogent legal argument or cite any contrary legal authority,
the Employer has effectively conceded that the 6.26.14 Order granting the invalid PPI credit is
void pursuant to Idaho Code §72-711 because it did not conform to the provisions of the act.
(3)

THE EMPLOYER HAS CONCEDED THAT THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
EXCEEDED ITS LIMITED JURISDICTION AND ENTERED A VOID ORDER
WHEN IT VIOLATED IDAHO CODE §72-318(1) BY APPROVING A
COMPENSATION AGREEMENT THAT RELIEVED THE EMPLOYER OF PART
OF ITS LIABILITY TO PAY CLAIMANT ALL TOTAL AND PERMANENT
DISABILITY BENEFITS THAT ARE REQUIRED BY IDAHO CODE §72-408
The Claimant has already established that Idaho Code §72-408 did not give the

Industrial Commission the statutory authority to grant Employer a credit for PPI benefits paid
before the Claimant was deemed totally and pennanently disabled. Since the compensation
agreement in this case relieved the Employer of its liability to pay a po1iion of the total and
permanent disability benefits that are required by Idaho Code §72-408, the agreement must be
declared invalid under Idaho Code §72-318(1):
72-318. INVALID AGREEMENTS -- PENALTY. (1) No agreement by an
employee to pay any portion of the premiums paid by his employer for
workmen's compensation, or to contribute to the cost or other security
maintained for or carried for the purpose of securing the payment of workmen's
compensation, or to contribute to a benefit fund or department maintained by the
employer, or any contract, rule, regulation or device whatever designed to

relieve the employer in whole or in part from any liability created by this
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law, shall be valid. Any employer who makes a deduction for such purpose
from the remuneration of any employee entitled to the benefits of this act shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor (emphasis and bold supplied).
The plain and unambiguous language of Idaho Code §72-318(1) clearly states that any
agreement, contract or device which relieves an Employer in whole or in part from any liability
created by the Act must be treated as an invalid agreement. Based on the basic canons of
statutory construction announced by this Court Mayer, the Industrial Commission had a duty to
simply follow the plain and unambiguous language of Idaho Code §72-318(1) as written and
declare the compensation agreement invalid because it relieved the Employer of having to pay
Claimant $39,649.50 in total and permanent disability benefits that the Employer is obligated to
pay pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408.
The Claimant argued that the compensation agreement in the case must be declared
invalid under Idaho Code §72-318(1) at pages 21-23 of his 4.15.16 Opening Brief. However,
when the Employer filed its 5.12.16 Respondent's Brief, the Employer completely ignored the
Claimant's Idaho Code §72-318(1) arguments and failed to present any cogent legal argument
or legal authority to support its position that the compensation agreement in this case did not
violate Idaho Code §72-318(1). The Employer did not even mention Idaho Code §72-318(1) a
single time in its entire Brief:
When the opening brief contains no authority on an issue presented, it is
immaterial that the party provides authority either in a reply brief or in
supplemental briefing because the issue had already been waived. See Estes, 132
Idaho at 87, 967 P.2d at 289. Gallagher v. State, 141 Idaho 665, 669, 115 P.3d
756, 760 (2005).
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By choosing to remain completely

on the Idaho Code

18(1)

not

make any cogent legal argument or cite any contrary legal authority m response to the
Claimant's Idaho Code §72-318(1) arguments, the Employer has effectively conceded the merit
of the Claimant's Idaho Code §72-318(1) argument and this Court should declare the
compensation agreement invalid to the extent that it relieved the Employer of part of its
obligation to pay all of the total and permanent disability benefits that are required by Idaho
Code §72-408.
(4)

IDAHO CODE §72-318_(2) PROHIBITS ALL AGREEMENTS WHICH REQUIRE AN
EMPLOYEE TO WAIVE HIS RIGHTS TO COMPENSATION UNDER THE ACT
The Claimant has proven that Idaho Code §72-408 does not authorize the Industrial

Commission to grant the Employer a credit for PPI benefits paid before the Claimant was
deemed totally and permanently disabled.

Since the compensation agreement in this case

required the Claimant to give Employer an invalid PPI credit of $39,649.50 and thereby waive
his rights to receive all of the total and permanent disability benefits that he is entitled to receive
under Idaho Code §72-408, the agreement must be declared invalid under Idaho Code §72318(2):
72-318. INVALID AGREEMENTS -- PENALTY.
(2) No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under
this act shall be valid. (emphasis and bold supplied)
The plain and unambiguous language of Idaho Code §72-318(2) states that all
agreements which require the employee to waive his rights to compensation under the act are
invalid. Based on the canons of statutory construction discussed in Mayer, the Industrial
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Commission had a duty to simply follow the

language of Idaho

18(2) as

written and declare the compensation agreement invalid because it required the Claimant to
waive his right to receive $39,649.50 in total and permanent disability benefits that the
Employer is required to pay pursuant to Idaho Code 72-408.
The Industrial Commission erred when it failed to apply basic canons of statutory
construction and simply follow the plain and unambiguous language of the statute as written.
Instead, the Commission misinterpreted this Court's holdings in Emery v. J.R. Simplot Co. 141
Idaho 407, 111 P.3d 92 (2005) and Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147
Idaho 277, 207 P3d 1008 (2009) and ruled that Idaho Code §72-318(2) can only be used to
invalidate agreements which require the Claimant to waive his rights to benefits that would be
paid out of future claims.
The Employer actually responded to the Claimant's Idaho Code §72-318(2) argument
and argued at page 11 of its 5.12.16 Respondent's Brief that Emery is controlling on this issue.
Nothing could be further from the truth. The facts in Emery are clearly distinguishable from the
facts in this case. The agreement in Emery was nothing more than a mere stipulation to dismiss
a doubtful and dubious claim with prejudice which did not require the Employer to pay the
Claimant any compensation for signing the stipulation to dismiss with prejudice.
The Commission found in Emery that the stipulation to dismiss did not violate Idaho
Code §72-318(2) or Idaho Code §72-711 because the agreement did not require the payment of
any compensation:
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In its August 29, 2003, order denying the motion to vacate the Commission
determined that I. C. § 72-711 was not relevant to this case because the
stipulation was not "an agreement in regard to compensation." The Commission
reasoned that since the stipulation addressed only the complaint filed by Emery
and "not the income or medical benefits for which Defendant was or was not
liable .... it cannot be considered an enforceable award of the Commission."
Similarly, the Commission refused to characterize the stipulation as an
agreement for a "lump sum" payment under LC. § 72-404. Thus, the
Commission's refusal to vacate its prior order approving the stipulation was
based on its findings that there was consideration supporting the agreement, and
that the agreement did not violate LC. § 72-318(2). In other words, LC. §§ 72711 and 72-404 were not relevant to the determination of whether the
Commission had the authority to approve the stipulation to dismiss with
prejudice. Emery v. J.R. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 411, 111 P.3d 92, 96
(2005) (emphasis supplied).
What is clear from this passage from Emery is that if the stipulation to dismiss had
required the periodic payment of total and permanent disability benefits like the compensation
agreement in this case, it would have been subject to Idaho Code §72-711 and Idaho Code §72318(2). However, because the stipulation to dismiss did not require the payment of
compensation, it did not violate Idaho Code §72-711 or Idaho Code §72-318(2). The converse
is true in this case because the compensation agreement approved by the Commission in its
6.26.14 Order required the Employer and the ISIF to pay the Claimant total and permanent
disability benefits at 45% of the average weekly state wage beginning on 10.1.13 and
continuing each month thereafter for the rest of his life pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408 and
Idaho Code §72-409 (R., p. 5, ~11, LL 10-12).
After stating that the Claimant was entitled to receive total and permanent disability
benefits at the statutory rate of 45% of the Average Weekly State Wage (A WSW), paragraphs
11 and 12 of the compensation agreement then required the Claimant to waive $39,649.50 of his
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and permanent disability

based on the

PPI

Commission had no statutory authority to grant to the Employer.
Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the compensation agreement obviously require the Claimant to
\vaive his rights to receive $39,649.50 in total and permanent disability benefits that are

required to be paid pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408 and must be declared invalid based on the
plain and unambiguous language of Idaho Code §72-318(2).
The Employer cited Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277,
207 P.3d 1008 (2009) for the proposition that Idaho Code §72-318(2) can only be used to
invalidate agreements that waive compensation rights stemming from future unknown injuries

5.

The Industrial Commission misinterpreted this Court's holding in Wernecke in the same manner
(R. p. 109, LL 5-15). However, the plain and literal words of Idaho Code §72-318(2) do not
limit application of that code section to agreements which only waive rights to compensation
arising from future claims. Just like this Court held in Corgatelli, the Commission and the Court
do not have the authority to judicially construct limitations which do not appear in the literal
words of the statute. This Court should take this opportunity to clarify that the plain and literal
language ofldaho Code §72-318(2) applies to all agreements that require the Claimant to waive
his right to compensation and is not limited to only agreements which require the Claimant to
waive his right to benefits arising from future claims.
1.
Idaho Code Section 72-318(2) Applies to AH Agreements Purporting
To Waive Rights to Compensation Under the Act.

'Seep. 13, LI. 1-3 of Employer's 5.12.16 Respondent's Brief.
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The cases on which ISIF relies to support its argument do not consider the issue
of whether section 72-318(2) only applies to agreements between an employee
and an employer. In Osick v. Public Employee Retirement System of Idaho, 122
Idaho 457, 835 P.2d 1268 (1992), we held that an agreement offsetting the
amount an employee was receiving under worker's compensation against the
employee's public employee retirement benefits did not violate section 72-318.
Id. at 461, 835 P.2d at 1272. The agreement did not relieve the employer from its
liability under the Act or otherwise reduce the employee's worker's compensation
benefits. Id. Instead, only PERSI (the Public Employee Retirement system) was
relieved of part of its liability to pay disability retirement benefits and the
relevant Idaho law did not prohibit a reduction of disability retirement benefits.
Id. Therefore, the claimant received his full entitlement of worker's
compensation, and no violation of section 72-318 occurred. Id. Notably absent
from the case is any discussion of whether section 72-318(2) applies to employee
agreements with parties other than the employer. ISIF, however, extracts the
following quote from Osick: " I.C. § 72-318 does not, however, prohibit a
reduction of disability retirement benefits. It only prohibits an agreement by an
employee to relieve an employer of an obligation that the employer has because
of the [worker's] compensation laws." Osick, 122 ldaho at 461, 835 P.2d at 1272.
Based on this quote, ISIF argues that the statute " only" prohibits certain
agreements between employees and employers. When reading Osick in its
entirety, however, it is apparent that ISIF's position is incorrect. The rationale
behind the Court's holding was that because the obligation and amount of
worker's compensation benefits were not affected by offsetting the amount
PERSI was obligated to pay for disability retirement benefits, no violation of
Idaho Code section 72-318 occurred. Id. ...

In keeping with the purposes of the Act, section 72-318(2) must be interpreted to
prohibit all agreements that waive an employee's rights to compensation under
the Act. To hold otherwise would mean that subsection (2) is mere surplusage
and would require a tortured interpretation of the statutory language. Wernecke,
supra, at 147 Idaho 283,207 P.3d 1014 (2009) (underline supplied).
The Wernecke Court analyzed the Osick agreement and held that it did not violate Idaho
Code §72-318 because it did not relieve the employer from its liability under the Act or

otherwise reduce the employee's worker's compensation benefits. The exact opposite is true in
this case. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the compensation agreement grant the Employer an invalid
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PPI credit which is not authorized by Idaho Code §72-408. Paragraphs

l and 12

the

Employer of its liability to pay the Claimant all of the total and permanent disability benefits
that he is entitled to receive under Idaho Code §72-408. And paragraphs 11 and 12 definitely
reduced the amount of the Claimant's total and permanent disability benefits by $39,649.50. If
the Osick agreement had these characteristics, this Court would have declared it invalid under
Idaho Code §72-318(2).
This Court has recently held that any agreement can be declared invalid under Idaho
Code §72-318 if the Claimant can prove that the agreement violates any provision of the act or
is illegal for some other reason.
This Court has set aside a lump sum agreement on grounds of illegality but in
that case the agreement was violative of the provisions of a workers'
compensation statute. See Wernecke, 147 Idaho at 286, 207 P.3d at 1017 (the
Commission " erred by approving an agreement" that purported to waive an
employee's right to compensation for future injuries because the Commission
failed to make findings required by LC. § 72-332). However, Morris does not
contend that the LSSA violates the provisions of any statute and has not shown
that it is afflicted by any other illegality. Morris v. Hap Taylor & Sons, Inc., 154
Idaho 633,301 P. 3d 639,643 (2013) (underline supplied).
Unlike the Claimant in Morris, the Claimant in this case has alleged and proved that the
invalid PPI credit that the Commission granted to the Employer violated Idaho Code §72-408,
Idaho Code §72-711, Idaho Code §72-318(1) and Idaho Code §72-318(2). Since the invalid PPI
credit in the compensation agreement relieves the Employer of its liability to pay the Claimant
the full measure of his future total and permanent disability benefits from week 90 to week 225
and requires the Claimant to waive $39,649.50 in future total and permanent disability benefits
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declare the PPI credit void under Idaho Code §72-318(1) and Idaho Code §72-318(2).
(5)

THIS COURT'S HOLDING IN CORGATELLI
RETROACTIVELY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE

SHOULD

BE

APPLIED

The Employer argues that this Court's holding in Corgatelli should not be applied
retroactively because an unknown number of cases would have to be re-opened and forcing
Employers to reimburse Claimants for the invalid PPI credits that they took in violation of
Idaho Code §72-408 might cause significant financial harm to other Employers

6•

The Court

should reject this argument because it rests on pure speculation. There is absolutely no reliable
evidence in the record before this Court which quantifies the actual number of total and
permanent disability cases still in existence where the Employer received an invalid PPI credit
that the Industrial Commission was not authorized to grant under Idaho Code §72-408. The
Court should not deprive the Claimant in this case of the sure and certain relief of $39,649.50 in
total and permanent disability benefits that he is entitled to receive under Idaho Code §72-408
based on pure speculation about the amount of invalid PPI credits that other Employers might
be required to reimburse in future cases.
The Employer has also asked this Court to weigh the equities and protect Employers
from the financial harm that they might suffer if they have to reimburse totally and permanently
disabled workers for the invalid PPI credits that they were never legally authorized to claim in
the first place. The Claimant agrees with the Employer that this Court should balance the

6

Seep. 13, LI. 14-16 and p. 15, LI. 7-10 of Employer's 5.12.16 Respondent's Brief.
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equities and ask itself which party is in

better position to bear the financial

the

PPI credit:
The totally and permanently disabled injured worker who is living on a fixed
income but did not receive all of the total and pennanent disability benefits that
he is entitled to receive under Idaho Code §72-408 or the corporate Employer
who has worker's compensation insurance to cover the risk of having to
reimburse injured workers for the invalid PPI credits that they took without
authority in violation ofldaho Code §72-408?
The public policy of this state requires the Employer / Surety to bear the financial
burden of providing the injured worker with all of the sure and certain relief that he is entitled to
receive under the workers' compensation Act:
Idaho's workers' compensation law is remedial legislation. It is a well-known
canon of statutory construction that remedial legislation is to be liberally
construed to give effect to the intent of the legislature. State By and Through
Alan G. Lance v. Hobby Horse Ranch Tractor and Equip. Co., 129 Idaho 565,
567, 929 P.2d 741, 743 (1996) (citing NORMAN J. SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.01 at 147 (5th ed.
1992)). The intent of the Idaho Legislature in enacting the workers'
compensation law was to provide "sure and certain relief for injured workmen
. . . regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other
remedy." ...
"The policy dictating Idaho adoption of its workers' compensation law is
stated as: The welfare of the state depends upon its industries and even more
upon the welfare of its wageworkers. The state of Idaho, therefore, exercising
herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the premises
are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for injured
workmen and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of
questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or
compensation, except as is otherwise provided in this act, and to that end all
civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all
jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished,
except as is in this law provided. I.C. § 72-201. 'We must liberally construe
the provisions of the workers' compensation law in favor of the employee, in
order to serve the humane purpose for which the law was promulgated."
Murray-Donahue v. Nat'/ Car Rental Licensee Ass'n, 127 Idaho 337, 340, 900

Claimant/ Appellant I Cross-Respondent's Reply Brief

26

P.2d 1348, 1351 (1995) (citing Davaz v. Priest River
125
Idaho 333, 337, 870 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1994)). Page v. McCain Foods, Inc.,
141 ldaho 342,345, 109 P.3d 1084, 1087 (2005).
The public policy of this state is to provide sure and certain relief to injured workers and
their families. This Court should liberally construe the language of Idaho Code §72-408 in
favor of the injured worker and balance the equities by requiring the Employer to provide the
Claimant with all of the total and pennanent disability benefits that he is entitled to receive
under Idaho Code §72-408.
Based on the arguments made by the Claimant at pp. 27-34 of his 4.15.16 Opening Brief
and a proper balancing of the equities between the totally and permanently disabled worker and
the corporate employer, the Claimant respectfully requests that the Court apply its holding in
Corgatelli retroactively to the unique facts present in this case and set aside the Industrial

Commission's 6.26.14 Order as a void Order that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to enter.
(6)

THE COURT SHOULD REJECT ALL OF THE EMPLOYER'S OTHER
ARGUMENTS THAT ARE BASED ON THE FALSE PREMISE THAT THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 6.26.14 ORDER WAS A VALID FINAL ORDER
The Employer has made the following arguments in an effort to convince this Court that

it lacks jurisdiction to consider the issues raised by the Claimant's appeal:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

The Complaint was dismissed with prejudice by a valid final order (See p. 4 of
Employer's Brief);
The Clamant did not file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal from a valid final
order as required by Idaho Code §72-718 (See pp. 4-6 of Employer's Brief);
The doctrine of res judicata bars the Claimant's attempt to modify the Commission's
valid final order (See pp. 6-7 of Employer's Brief);
The Commission lacks jurisdiction to modify a valid final order pursuant to Idaho
Code §72-719 more than 5 years after the date of the industrial accident (See pp. 7-8
of Employer's Brief);
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(f)

The stipulation to dismiss with prejudice was merged into a
final
pursuant to JRP 12(D) (See pp. 8-11 of Employer's Brief); and,
Granting the Employer an invalid PPI credit in violation of Idaho Code §72-408
does not constitute an impermissible waiver under Idaho Code §72-318(2) (See pp.
11-13).
All of these arguments rest on the same false premise that the Industrial Commission's

6.26.14 Order is a valid final Order which cannot be modified. However, if the Court agrees
with the Claimant's argument and rules that the Commission's 6.26.14 Order is not a valid final
Order, but rather a void Order because the Commission exceeded its limited jurisdiction by
granting the Employer a PPI credit that is not authorized by Idaho Code §72-408 or any
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, then all of the Employer's arguments that are
based on the false premise of a valid final order must fail:
However, neither of these doctrines applies in the case of a contract that violates
the law. If a contract is illegal and void, the court will leave the parties as it finds
them and refuse to enforce the contract. The contract cannot be treated as valid
by invoking waiver or estoppel. Whitney v. Cont'! Life & Accident Co., 89 Idaho
96, 105, 403 P.2d 573, 579 (1965). Therefore, because the Agreement was illegal
and violative of the Act, ISIF cannot rely on the doctrines of waiver and estoppel
to enforce the Agreement against Wernecke. Absent limited circumstances not
present here, this Court will not enforce an illegal contract, regardless of the fact
that the parties knowingly entered into that contract. ...
In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three
requirements: (1) same parties; (2) same claim; and (3) a valid final judgment.
Id. at 124, 157 P.3d at 618 ....
Because we have determined that the Agreement and ensuing order were void,
there is no " valid final judgment," and res iudicata does not bar the present
claim ....
One of the five elements is that there was a final judgment on the merits in the
prior litigation. Id. Whether collateral estoppel bars the litigation of an issue is a
question of law which we freely review. Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc., 141
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Idaho 604, 617, 114 P.3d 974, 987 (2005). In this case, the Agreement ancLorder
were void and cannot be the basis for imposing collateral estoppel because there
is no valid final judgment.
Ill.
Because the Agreement violates the Act and because the Commission's order is void,
we vacate the Commission's decision and remand the case for further proceedings.
Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 287-288, 207
P .3d 1008, 1018-1019 (2009) (emphasis supplied).

The Claimant in this case has conclusively proved that the Industrial Commission's
6.26.14 Order was not a valid final Order because the Industrial Commission exceeded the
limited jurisdiction granted to it by Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-711 when it
granted Employer the invalid PPI credit. Since all of the Employer's arguments are based on
the false premise that the Industrial Commission entered a valid final order, all of the
Employer's arguments must fail. This Court should declare the 6.26.14 Order void and set it
aside pursuant to its holdings in Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508
(2003), Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984) and Martin v.
Soden, 81 Idaho 274, 284-285, 340 P.2d 848, 854-855 (1959).
(7)

THE INDUSTRlAL COMMISSION ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
CLAIMANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORiNEY'S FEES
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE §72-804
This Court has held that an award of attorney's fees is appropriate under Idaho Code

§72-804 if any of the following conditions has been met :
Attorney fees are awardable under Idaho Code § 72-804, if the employer/surety
(a) contested a claim without a reasonable ground; or (b) neglected or refused to
pay the compensation within a reasonable time after receipt of a written claim; or
(c) discontinued payment of compensation without reasonable grounds.
Whether or not grounds exist for awarding a claimant attorney fees under the
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statute is a factual determination that rests with the Industrial Commission.
Gooby v. Lake Shore Mgmt. Co., 136 Idaho 79, 29 P.3d 390 (2001). The
Commission's decision regarding the awarding of attorney fees will be upheld if
it is based upon substantial, competent evidence. Id. Lorca-Merono v. Yokes
Washington Foods, Inc.,, 137 Idaho 446,456, 50 P.3d 461,471 (2002).
The Employer has admitted that it understands this Court's holding in Corgatelli and
realizes that there is absolutely no statutory provision in the entire workers' compensation Act
which gives the Industrial Commission the authority to grant the Employer a PPI credit:
This Court's decision in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., decided an issue of first
impression holding there is no statutory authority for an employer to receive
credit for PPI benefits paid before the award of total and permanent. disability
benefits. 157 Idaho 287,292,335 P.3d 1150, 1155 (2014). (Seep. 9, LL 10-13 of
Employer's 5.12.16 Respondent's Brief) (emphasis supplied).
If the Employer knows that there was no statutory authority for the Industrial

Commission to grant its PPI credit, then it is axiomatic that the Employer likewise knows that
the Commission's 6.26.14 Order is void because the Industrial Commission acted beyond its
limited jurisdiction when it granted a PPI credit that is not authorized by any provision in the
entire workers' compensation Act. In spite of that knowledge, the Employer has: (a) contested
the Claimant's right to receive all of his total and permanent disability benefits that he is entitled
to receive under Idaho Code §72-408 without reasonable grounds; (b) neglected or refused to
pay the Claimant all of his total and permanent disability compensation benefits within a
reasonable time after receipt of the Claimant's 1.15.15 written claim for benefits without
reasonable grounds (R. pp. 53-54); and (c) discontinued payment of compensation without
reasonable grounds.
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Employer's refusal to pay Claimant all

total

permanent disability

that are required by Idaho Code §72-408 is based on the false premise that the Industrial
Commission had the statutory authority to grant the Employer the invalid PPI credit in its
6.26.14 Order. After reading this Court's holding in Corgate!li, the Employer kne,v for certain
that the Industrial Commission exceeded its limited jurisdiction when it granted the Employer a
PPI credit that is not authorized by any provision of workers' compensation Act. After reading
this Court's holding in Corgatelli, the Employer knew for certain that the Industrial
Commission's 6.26.14 Order was void because the Industrial Commission exceeded its limited
jurisdiction when it granted a PPI credit not authorized by statute.
The Employer's cannot justify its refusal to pay the Claimant all the total and permanent
disability benefits that he is entitled to receive under Idaho Code §72-408 based on the false
pretense of a valid final order when the Employer knows that it is really a void order entered in
excess of the Commission's limited jurisdiction. Pretending that a void Order is a valid final
Order when you know that position is false is clearly unreasonable conduct that should justify
an award of attorney's fees under Idaho Code §72-804.
This Court should reverse the Industrial Commission's denial of the Claimant's request
for attorney's fees and award the Claimant attorney fees and costs against the Employer
beginning on the date when Claimant made his claim for the payment of total and permanent
disability benefits on 1.15 .15 through all stages of this claim pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804
and this Court's holding in Stevens- McAtee v. Potlatch C01p., 145 Idaho 325, 337, 179 P.3d
288, 300 (2008).
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(8)
ATTORNEY'S FEES AGAINST CLAIMANT OR CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL
PURSUANT TO IDAHO APPELLATE RULE 11.2
This Court held in Corgatelli that there is absolutely no statutory basis for the Industrial
Commission to grant an Employer a credit for PPI benefits paid before the Claimant was
deemed totally and permanently disabled.

Based on that holding, it is axiomatic that the

Industrial Commission did not have the statutory authority or jurisdiction to award the
Employer in this case a PPI credit of $39,649.50 in its 6.26.14 Order. Since the Commission
lacked the statutory jurisdiction to grant the PPI credit, it is axiomatic that the Commission's
6.26.14 Order is void to the extent that the Commission granted Employer relief that the
Commission did not have the authority to grant.

This Court always has the authority to set

aside void Orders at any time. Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003),

Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984) and Martin v. Soden, 81
Idaho 274, 284-285, 340 P.2d 848, 854-855 (1959).
The Claimant's Petition For Declaratory Ruling and this Appeal are clearly warranted by
existing law and by the good faith argument for the extension of existing law. The plain and
literal language of Idaho Code §72-408 supports the Claimant's position that the Industrial
Commission lacked jurisdiction to grant Employer a PPI credit. Employer did not even discuss
how this Court should interpret Idaho Code §72-408 once in its entire 18-page 5.12.16
Respondent's Brief or address the Claimant's limited jurisdiction argument.
The Claimant's argument that the Commission exceeded its limited jurisdiction granted
to it under Idaho Code §72-711 when it approved a compensation agreement that did not
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conform to the provisions

the law is supported by

Code §72-408

and Idaho Code §72-711. The Employer did not discuss the merits of the Claimant's Idaho
Code §72-711 arguments but instead chose to dodge the Idaho Code §72-711 issue by making
the absurd statement that the compensation agreement in this case was not really a
compensation agreement but merely a stipulation to dismiss, even though the agreement
requires the periodic payment of total and permanent disability benefits each month for the rest
ofhe Claimant's life pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho Code §72-409.
The Claimant's argument that the compensation agreement in this case should be treated
as an invalid contract under plain language of Idaho Code §72-318(1) is supported by existing
law because the compensation agreement is obviously an agreement, contract or device which
relieves the Employer in whole or in part from its liability to pay all of the total and permanent
disability benefits that Employer is obligated to pay Idaho Code §72-408. The Employer did not
even address the Claimant's Idaho Code §72-318(1) arguments in its 5.12.16 Respondent's
Brief.
The Claimant's argument that the compensation agreement in this case violates the plain
language of Idaho Code §72-318(2) is supported by existing law because the compensation
agreement obviously requires the Claimant to waive his right to receive $39,649.50 in PPI
benefits that the Claimant is entitled to receive under Idaho Code §72-408. The Employer did
not even address the plain language of Idaho Code §72-318(2) but attempted to avoid the
outcome of a proper statutory analysis by misinterpreting this Court's holding in Emery and
Wernecke.
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The Claimant's argument that

Court's holding

should be

retroactively to the unique facts of this case is supported by existing law and by a good faith
argument for the extension of existing law. The Employer asked the Court to weigh the equities
and protect Employers in other cases from the financial burden of having to reimburse totally
and permanently disabled workers for invalid PPI credits that the Employers took in violation of
Idaho Code §72-408. A balancing of the equities supports Claimant's position.
The Employer argues that the Claimant's Appeal was filed for an improper purpose to
harass, cause unnecessary delay and needlessly increase the cost of litigation. This arguments is
truly ironic since it is actually the Employer's unreasonable refusal to pay the Claimant all of
his total and permanent disability benefits that he is entitled to receive under Idaho Code §72408 based on the false premise that the Commission's 6.26.14 void Order is a valid final Order
that is truly unreasonable, vexatious and harassing.
The Employer has admitted that it knows that the Industrial Commission did not have
any statutory authority to grant the invalid PPI credit but it continues to hide behind the false
premise that the Commission's 6.26.14 Order was a valid final Order which bars all future
proceedings. The Employer's refusal to pay the benefits required by Idaho Code §72-408 based
on a void Order that the Industrial Commission lacked the jurisdiction to enter is clearly
frivolous and without any foundation in fact or law.
Given the facts of this case, the Claimant could have easily asserted a claim for
attorney's fees against Employer's Defense counsel pursuant to l.A.R. 11.2 because he has
evidently advised his clients to refuse to pay all of the total and permanent disability benefits
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Claimant is entitled to receive pursuant to Idaho Code §72-408 and Idaho

§72-409

based on the false premise that a void Order is a valid final order when he clearly knows
otherwise. The Claimant chose to not waste this Court's scarce judicial resources with
unncccssarj ad hominen attacks.

(B)

REBUTTAL OF THE ISIF'S ARGUMENTS

(1)

THE ISIF CANNOT RAISE NEW ISSUES ON APPEAL THAT IT DID NOT RAISE
IN ITS LIMITED APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Claimant filed his Petition For Declaratory Ruling with the Industrial Commission

pursuant to JRP 15 on 2.26.15 (R., pp. 13-17). The ISIF filed on its Limited Appearance To
Challenge Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Service of Process with the Industrial Commission on
3.12.15 (R., pp. 76-81). The ISIF did not address the substantive merits of any of the arguments
that the Claimant made to the Industrial Commission in support of his Petition For Declaratory
Ruling but chose to limit the scope of its Limited Appearance to challenging the Industrial
Commission's exercise of subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction:
This Response is made by the ISIF for the limited purpose of seeking dismissal
of the Petition on grounds that the Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the Petition, and that the service of the Petition violates the Rules of
Practice and Procedure which in tum results in a failure of personal jurisdiction
over the ISIF with respect to the Petition. Although the Commission's Rules of
Practice and Procedure do not specifically address a limited appearance for the
purpose of contesting subject matter and personal jurisdiction, undersigned
counsel believes that the Commission may look to IRCP 12(b) by way of
analogy and by way of guidance in reviewing the ISIF limited appearance
Response (R., p. 77, LL 5-13) (emphasis supplied).
The ISIF admitted that the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho
Workers' Compensation Law (JRP) do not authorize a Limited Appearance for the purpose of
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challenging jurisdiction so the ISIF asked the Industrial Commission to analogize to the
standards which govern I.R.C.P. 12(b). However, this Court has held that the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure do not apply to proceedings before the Industrial Commission:
However, Page cannot rely on l.R.C.P. 6(a). The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
govern in the district courts and the magistrate's division of the district courts.
I.R.C.P. l(a). The Industrial Commission is not a division of the district court.
See I. C. § 72-501 (1) (statutory creation of the Industrial Commission as an
executive department of the state government). Furthermore, the Commission
has the authority to "promulgate and adopt reasonable rules and regulations
involving judicial matters" and to the extent the regulations are consistent with
law, they are binding.l41 I.C. § 72-508. Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 Idaho
302, 311, 179 P.3d 265, 274 (2008).
Pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 72-508 and 72-707," the Commission adopted the
Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure " as governing judicial matters under its
jurisdiction as provided by the Idaho Workers' Compensation Law." J.R.P., intro.
cmt. Warren v. Williams & Parsons PC CPAS, 157 Idaho 528, 535, 337 P.3d
1257, 1265 (2014).
If this Court decides to consider the arguments made by the ISIF in its Limited

Appearance even though its Limited Appearance is not authorized by the JRP and the IRCP do
not apply to proceedings before the Industrial Commission, the Court should limit the scope of
its analysis to the ISIF's lack of subject matter jurisdiction argument and lack of personal
jurisdiction argument because those were the only arguments made by the ISIF in its 3.12.15
Limited Appearance:
The longstanding rule of this Court is that we will not consider issues that are
presented for the first time on appeal. E.g., Kinsela v. State, Dep't of Finance,
117 Idaho 632, 634, 790 P.2d 1388, 1390 (1990). Recently we applied the rule to
dismiss the appeal in a case where the state asked us to rule on an issue that was
not raised in the trial court. State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 808 P.2d 1322
(1991).
The rationale for this rule was first stated by the Supreme Court of the Territory

Claimant/ Appellant/ Cross-Respondent's Reply Brief

36

Idaho in 1867:

It is for the protection of inferior courts. It is manifestly unfair for a party to go
into court and slumber, as it were, on [a] defense, take no exception to the ruling,
present no point for the attention of the court, and seek to present [the] defense,
that was never mooted before, to the judgment of the appellate court. Such a
practice would destroy the purpose of an appeal and make the supreme court one
for deciding questions of law in the first instance. Smith v. Sterling, 1 Idaho 128,
131 (1867).
In Johnson v. Diefendorf, 56 Idaho 620, 633, 57 P.2d 1068, 1073 (1936), the
Court refused to discuss or decide the validity of a statute on grounds that were
not pleaded or submitted to the trial court. In Oregon Shortline R.R. v. City of
Chubbuck, 93 Idaho 815, 817, 474 P.2d 244, 246 (1970), the Court declined to
decide whether a statute was unconstitutional when the issues had not been
raised by the pleadings nor argued or decided in the trial court. Sanchez v.
Arave, 120 Idaho 321,322,815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991).
The ISIF did not make any of the following arguments in its Limited Appearance before
the Industrial Commission and this Court should disregard these arguments in their entirety:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)

the Corgatelli argument on page 19;
the Idaho Code §72-707 argument on pages 19-20;
the Owsley argument on page 20;
the law review arguments on pages 20-21;
the Idaho Code §72-318(2) argument on pages 21-22;
the Wernecke arguments on page 21-22;
the Emery argument on page 21;
the Corgatelli arguments on pages 22-23;
the Carey argument on page 23;
the Corgatelli arguments on pages 23-24; and
the plain and unambiguous language arguments on pages 26-28.
Since the ISIF made all of these new arguments for the first time on appeal, the Court

should disregard all of the ISIF arguments except the lack of subject matter jurisdiction
argument and the lack of personal jurisdiction argument that were properly preserved in the
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3.12.15 Limited Appearance filed with the Industrial
(2)

7
~~.,uuu00

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAD SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO
DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF ITS 6.26.14 ORDER PURSUANT TO JRP 15
Idaho Code §72-508 grants the Industrial Commission the authority to adopt reasonable

rules and regulations that are necessary to accomplish the purposes of the workers'
compensation Act. The primary public policy purpose of the Act is to provide the injured
worker with sure and certain relief:
The adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") in 1965, served as a
general statutory grant of rule-making authority to administrative agencies to
promulgate rules and regulations to effect the purposes of the specific acts they
are required to administer. See Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 666, 791 P.2d
410,416 (1990). In addition, the state legislature has, by statute, empowered the
Commission to issue rules and regulations necessary to accomplish the purposes
of the Workers' Compensation Act. LC. § 72-508. The purpose of the Workers'
Compensation Act, enacted under the broad canopy of the police power, is stated
in LC. § 72-201 to provide "sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their
families .... " ...
Given the broad empowerment provided by LC. § 72-508, coupled with the
purpose underlying the Workers' Compensation Act, i.e., to provide "sure and
certain relief for injured workmen and their families," I.C. § 72-201, we cannot
agree with Rhodes' contention. Rhodes v. Industrial Com'n, 125 Idaho 139, 141142, 868 P.2d 467, 469-470 (1993).

A. Statutory Authority
As a creature of legislative invention, the Commission may only act pursuant to
an enumerated power, whether it be directly statutory or based upon rules and
regulations properly issued by the Commission under I.C. § 72-508. [Il
[IJ Idaho Code§ 72-508 enables the Commission to issue rules and regulations
necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. The
underlying purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is stated in I.C. § 72-201

7 The

ISIF did not address the lack of personal jurisdiction issue in its 5.12.16 Respondent's Brief and has therefore waived that issue.
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to provide "sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families .... "
Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686,691,864 P.2d 132, 137 (1993).
Pursuant to the rule making authority granted to it by Idaho Code §72-508, the Industrial
Commission adopted the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure Under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Law (JRP). JRP 15 A. describes the purpose of the Commission's Declaratory
Rulings rule as follows:
The Commission provides this format for rulings on the construction, validity, or
applicability of any workers' compensation statute, rule, or order ( emphasis
supplied).
JRP 15 clearly gives the Industrial Commission the subject matter jurisdiction to rule on
the validity of any Order. The Claimant used this rule to challenge the validity of the Industrial
Commission's 6.26.14 Order. In spite of the plain and unambiguous language of JRP 15 A., the
ISIF argued at pages 14-19 of its 5.12.16 Respondent's Brief that the Industrial Commission
does not have jurisdiction under JRP 15 to determine the validity of its 6.26.14 Order. This is a
very disingenuous argument for the ISIF to make considering that the ISIF filed a Petition For
Declaratory Relief pursuant to JRP 15 and asked the Commission to rule on the validity of a
prior Order approving a LSSA in the famous case of Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist.

No. 401, 147 Idaho 277,207 P.3d 1008 (2009):
ISIF, on the other hand, argued that the Agreement barred any further recovery
from ISIF and filed a petition for a declaratory ruling pursuant to Rule 15 of the
Commission's Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure. Wernecke argued that
the Agreement violated the Worker's Compensation Act (the Act), and was
therefore void. The Commission granted ISIF's petition, finding the Agreement
valid. It further held that W emecke's present claim against ISIF was barred by
the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and quasi-estoppel, and that she
had waived her right to pursue another claim against ISIF. Wernecke appeals
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from the --,, ..... ".~"'" order. Id. at 147 Idaho 281, 207 P.
supplied).

1012 (emphasis

Since the ISIF used JRP 15 to obtain a Declaratory Ruling interpreting the validity of a
prior Order in Wernecke, the ISIF cannot seriously contend in this case that the Commission
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under JRP 15 to interpret the validity of its 6.26.14 Order. The
Court should reject this spurious argument based on its holding in Williams v. Blue Cross of
Idaho, 151 Idaho 51,260 P.3d 1186 (2011).
In Williams, the Claimant entered into a final lump sum settlement agreement with the
State Insurance Fund which was finalized and approved by the Industrial Commission. After
the settlement agreement was finalized and approved by the Commission, the Claimant filed a
Petition For Declaratory Ruling pursuant to JRP 15 and asked the Commission to interpret the
legal rights of all interested persons to the settlement proceeds (including the rights of a nonparty subrogee).
Although neither party challenged the Commission's exercise of subject matter
jurisdiction on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
sua sponte and held that the Industrial Commission had subject matter jurisdiction to determine
all interested persons' legal rights in the lump sum agreement that had already been finalized
and approved by the Commission just like the Compensation Agreement in this case:
[T]he Commission may properly exercise jurisdiction in cases, like this one,
where the Commission is asked to clarify a claimant's rights under a lump sum
settlement agreement. Pursuant to LC. § 72-404, the Commission has the
_responsibility tOJ!PPIOVe lump sum settlement agreements and in doing so, must
determine that the settlement is in the best interest of the parties. It necessarily
follows that the Commission has jurisdiction to clarify a claimant's rights under a
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lump sum settlement agreement that is presented for Commission approval.
151 ldaho 54-55, 260 P.3d 1189-1190. Id. at 151 ldaho 155-156, 260 P.3d 11901191 (emphasis supplied).
This Court's holding in Williams makes it absolutely clear that the Industrial
Commission had subject matter jurisdiction to clarify the parties' legal rights under the
compensation agreement and determine the validity of the Industrial Commission's 6.26.14
Order pursuant to Idaho Code §72-707, Idaho Code §72-711 and JRP 15. The Court should
reject all of the ISIF's lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguments because they lack merit.
(3)

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 6.26.14 ORDER WAS NOT-AVALID FINAL
ORDER BUT A VOID ORDER THAT CAN BE ATTACKED AND SET ASIDE AT
ANYTIME
The only substantive argument that the ISIF has properly preserved for appeal is that the

Industrial Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Claimant's Petition For
Declaratory Ruling

8•

However, this argument lacks merit because it is based on the false

premise that the Industrial Commission entered a valid final Order in its 6.26.14 Order of
Approval and Discharge. The Commission's 6.26.14 Order cannot be considered a valid final
Order for the following reasons:

8

1.

The Commission did not have jurisdiction under Idaho Code §72-408 to grant the
Employer a PPI credit not authorized by the statute and the Commission cannot
judicially construct a credit which does not exist in the statute;

2.

The Commission did not have jurisdiction under Idaho Code §72-711 to approve a
compensation agreement which did not conform to the provisions of the law because
it granted Employer a PPI credit not authorized by Idaho Code §72-408;

3.

The compensation agreement is invalid under Idaho Code §72-318(1) because it is
an agreement, contract or device which relieved the Employer of its liability to pay

See pp. 10-14 of the ISIF's 5.12.16 Respondent's Brief.
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Claimant all of the total and permanent disability
receive under Idaho Code §72-408; and,
4.

that he 1s

The Compensation agreement is invalid under Idaho Code §72-318(2) because it
required the Claimant to waive his right to receive $39,649.50 in total and permanent
disability benefits that he is entitled to receive under Idaho Code §72-408.
What is ironic about the ISIF's position in this case is that it has agreed with the

Claimant's primary contention that the Industrial Commission only has limited jurisdiction and
can only perform those acts which are specifically authorized by statute. See Curr v. Curr, 124
Idaho 686, 864 P. 132 (1993) and St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Edmondson, 130
Idaho 108,937 P.2d 420 (1997). The ISIF even cited this Court's holding in Idaho Power Co. v.
Idaho Public Util. Com 'n, 102 Idaho 744,639 P.2d 442 (1981) where the Court held that a void
Order could be collaterally attacked even though there was a statute directly on point which
stated that final orders could not be collaterally attacked.
The ISIF cannot admit that the Industrial Commission has limited jurisdiction and can
only perform those acts which are specifically authorized by statute, but then turn around and
take the totally inconsistent position that the Industrial Commission had the authority to
judicially construct a PPI credit of $39,649.50 in its 6.26.14 Order of Approval and Discharge
when it knows that the literal words of Idaho Code §72-408 did not authorize the Industrial
Commission to grant Employer such a PPI credit.
This Court should reject all of the ISIF's lack of subject matter jurisdiction arguments
because they are all based on the same false premise that the Industrial Commission's 6.26.14
Order is a valid final Order.

Since the Industrial Commission did not have the statutory
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authority to grant Employer a PPI credit and approved a compensation agreement which did not
conform to the provisions of the law, this Court should declare the 6.26.14 Order void and set
aside the invalid PPI credit. This Court always has the authority to set aside void Orders at any
time. Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003), Andre v. Aformw, 106
Idaho 455,459,680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984) and Martin v. Soden, 81 Idaho 274, 284-285, 340
P.2d 848, 854-855 (1959).
(4)

THE ISIF ADMITS THAT THE STIPULATION IN THIS CASE IS A
COMPENSATION AGREEMENT THAT IS SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL
REQUIREMENTS OF IDAHO CODE §72-711
The ISIF also agreed with the Claimant's position that the stipulation in this case is a

compensation agreement that is subject to approval requirements of Idaho Code §72-711.
Under Idaho Code §72-711, a compensation agreement between the Claimant
and Employer/Surety, and also between a Claimant and the ISIF, upon approval
by the Industrial Commission, "shall for all purposes be an award by the
Commission and be enforceable under the provisions of §72-735, unless
modified as provided in §72-719." See page 10 of ISIF's 5.12.16 Respondent's
Brief, LL 9-12 (underline in original).
The ISIF quoted a portion of Idaho Code §72-711 but left out the most important last
sentence:
72-711. Compensation agreements. An agreement shall be approved !!y_the
commission only when the terms conform to the provisions of this law
(underline and bold supplied).
The compensation agreement approved by the Commission in this case clearly did not
conform to the provisions of this law because it granted Employer an invalid PPI credit of
$39,649.50 that the Industrial Commission was not authorized to grant to Employer under Idaho
Code §72-408 or any other provision of the workers' compensation act. Corgatelli v. Steel West,

Claimant/ Appellant/ Cross-Respondent's Reply Brief

43

should declare the 6.26.14 Order

157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014).

and set it aside to the extent that it granted Employer a PPI credit that the Commission did not
have jurisdiction to award.
The ISIF cited this Court's holding in Drake v. State of Idaho, Industrial Special
Indemnity Fund, 128 Idaho 880, 920 P.2d 397 (1996) to support its argument that the Industrial
Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction

9.

The holding in Drake actually supports the

Claimant's arguments because this Court held that a compensation agreement must be approved
by the Industrial Commission pursuant to the requirements of Idaho Code § 72-711:
A liable party and an injured employee are permitted to enter into a settlement
with regard to compensation, but the agreement must be approved by the
Commission. LC. § 72-711. Upon approval, the agreement is for all purposes
considered to be an award by the Commission. Id. The approved agreement
constitutes a final decision of the Commission which is subject to a motion for
reconsideration or rehearing pursuant to I.C. § 72-718. Davidson v. H.H. Keim
Co., 110 Idaho 758, 760, 718 P.2d 1196, 1198 (1986). Id at 128 Idaho 882, 920
P. 2d 399 (1996) ( emphasis supplied).
This case is clearly distinguishable from Drake. In Drake, the Claimant did not argue
that the Industrial Commission exceeded the limited jurisdiction granted to it by Idaho Code
§72-408 by giving the Employer a PPI credit against its obligation to pay total and permanent
disability benefits that is not authorized by Idaho Code §72-408 or any other provision in the
workers' compensation Act. In Drake, the Claimant did not argue that Industrial Commission's
Order approving the compensation agreement was void under Idaho Code §72-711 because the
Industrial Commission lacked the jurisdiction to approve a compensation agreement that did not
conform to the provisions of the workers' compensation Act. In Drake, the Claimant did not
'See pp. I 1-l4 of!SIF's 5.12.l6 Respondent's Brief.
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that the compensation agreement was invalid under Idaho Code §72-31

) because it

was an agreement, contract or device that relieved the Employer of its liability to pay all total
and permanent disability benefits that are required by Idaho Code §72-408.

In Drake, the

Claimant did not argue that the compensation agreement vvas invalid under Idaho Code §72=

318(2) because it required the Claimant to waive his right to receive all of the total and
permanent disability benefits that he was entitled to receive under Idaho Code §72-408. In

Drake, the Claimant did not have a decision from the Idaho Supreme Court directly on point
like Corgatelli which clearly stated that the Industrial Commission did not have any statutory
authority or jurisdiction to grant the PPI credit that was awarded to Employer in this case.
Unlike the Claimant in Drake, the Claimant in this case has alleged and proved that the
Industrial Commission's 6.26.14 Order is void because the Industrial Commission exceeded its
limited jurisdiction when it granted relief to the Employer that the Industrial Conunission did
not have the statutory authority to grant. This Court should exercise its inherent authority to set
aside the void Order. This Court always has the authority to set aside void Orders at any time.

Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P .3d 502, 508 (2003 ), Andre v. Morrow, I 06 Idaho
455,459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984) and Martin v. Soden, 81 Idaho 274, 284-285, 340 P.2d
848, 854-855 (1959).

(II)

CONCLUSION

Based on the appellate standards set forth in Idaho Code §72-732(2), the Claimant
respectfully asks this Court to declare the Industrial Commission's 6.26.14 Order void because
the Industrial Commission acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers when it granted
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Employer a PPI credit that is not authorized by Idaho Code §72-408 or any other provision in the
Idaho workers' compensation Act.

Respectfully submitted this 9th day of June 2016.

Ellsworth, Kallas, & Defranco, PLLC
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